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DERIVATIVES AND BANKRUPTCY:  THE FLAWED 
CASE FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT 
Stephen J. Lubben* 
The casual reader of recent scholarship on the treatment of contracts in 
chapter 11 could easily suppose that the Bankruptcy Code is the source of 
great injustices and inefficiencies.1  According to the standard account, 
chapter 11 locks third parties into inefficient contracts while allowing the 
debtor to “cherry pick” which contracts it wants to perform.2  Cherry 
picking is deemed “bad,” for reasons that are generally rather vague.3 
The putative scourge of cherry picking provides the foundation for the 
Bankruptcy Code’s special treatment of derivative contracts,4 which are not 
 
*Daniel J. Moore Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.  Many thanks to 
Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Kristen Boon, R. Michael Farquhar, Adam Levitin, Andrew Shaffer, 
David Skeel, Charles Sullivan, Tracey Kaye, and Elizabeth Warren for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. 
 1. E.g., Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1199 (2005) (arguing that a bankruptcy law focused on capital cost reduction would be 
much smaller and less centralized than current law). 
 2. Id. at 1232.  Apparently cherries are the fruit of choice when discussing contracts 
and bankruptcy; this paper will adhere to the convention.  E.g., Rhett G. Campbell, Energy 
Future and Forward Contracts, Safe Harbors and the Bankruptcy Code, 78 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 1, 44 (2004) (discussing the debtors’ ability to assume or reject certain trade provisions 
based on their financial advantage); Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative 
Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 54 (1996)(discussing creditors’ normal 
procedure of picking only those outstanding swaps which provide a net-positive value to the 
debtor company); Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative 
Finance Or The Dance Into The Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1059-60 (1994) 
(discussing the ability of an administrator or trustee for the insolvent counterparty to cherry 
pick profitable contracts and refuse to honor unprofitable ones). 
 3. Cf. John C. Dugan, Derivatives: Netting, Insolvency, and End Users, 112 BANKING 
L.J. 638, 640 (1995) (explaining that bankruptcy can entail legal risks such as cherry-
picking). 
 4. Financial derivatives are contracts that derive their value from interest rates, the 
outcome of specific events, or the price of underlying assets such as debt or equities. 
FRANKLIN ALLEN, RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 727 (8th ed. 2006).  Well known examples include options, futures, and forwards.  
Id.  See Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 82 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 77 (2008); infra Part III.  See also Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and 
the Resolution Of Financial Distress, in THE CREDIT DERIVATIVES HANDBOOK (Greg N. 
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subject to the automatic stay5 or the Bankruptcy Code’s normal rules 
prohibiting termination solely as a result of one party’s bankruptcy filing.6  
Alternatively, some argue that the special treatment of derivatives is 
justified because “derivatives contracts are generally not firm-specific 
assets and therefore giving them special treatment will increase economic 
efficiency.”7 
The first argument, although finding some support in a few loosely 
reasoned opinions,8 misconstrues the executory contract provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code and ignores the fact that parties can always “cherry pick” 
which contracts to perform outside of bankruptcy:  this is the well 
recognized “option to breach” embedded in every contract.9  Moreover, the 
second argument, while initially more convincing, falters once we consider 
that the vast bulk of firms that seek relief under chapter 11 are not financial 
firms.10  Rather, these debtors are operating companies or groups that use 
derivatives as insurance against the risks faced in the course of their 
business:  that is, they use derivatives as hedges, rather than for 
speculation.11  A derivative used as a hedge is an integral part of the going 
concern value of the business.12 
Does this mean that the case for the special treatment of derivatives is 
fatally flawed?  No.  But the case is inherently weak.13  The best argument 
 
Gregoriou & Paul U. Ali eds., McGraw-Hill 2008). 
 5. 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
 6. See Shmuel Vasser, Derivatives in Bankruptcy, 60 BUS. LAW 1507, 1510 (2005) 
(discussing how the Bankruptcy Code sometimes limits normal bankruptcy procedures in 
cases of alleged systemic risk). 
 7. Frank R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: 
Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 92, 94 (2005). 
 8. E.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 873 (7th Cir. 2004) (asserting by citation to 
section 362 itself that the “automatic stay prevents [parties under contract] from walking 
away”). 
 9. The option to breach concept has been recognized in both the law and economics 
discussions of “efficient breach,” RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 133 
(5th ed. 1998), and more broadly, in Legal Realist conceptions of contract. See Jay 
Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 231 
(1989) (“'Assume’ and ‘reject’ are merely bankruptcy terms for the decision to perform or to 
breach, an election open to any party to a contract outside of bankruptcy”). 
 10. Of the 734 debtors in Lynn LoPucki’s database http://www.lopucki.com, only 38 
appear to have finance related operations. 
 11. Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets:  Online Securities 
Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371, 385-86 
(2006). 
 12. See Justin Baer, Southwest Airlines’ fuel hedging boosts profits, FIN. TIMES, July 25, 
2008, at 14-15 (explaining that Southwest’s derivatives are valued at $4.3 billion and cover 
80 percent of the company’s fuel bill and 70 percent of 2009’s expected costs). 
 13. Perhaps it is fatally weak when considered in conjunction with Edwards & 
Morrison’s convincing argument that excluding derivatives from the bankruptcy process 
increases the risks of contagion in the financial system.  Edwards & Morrison, supra note 7, 
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for excusing derivatives from the normal rules of chapter 11 turns on 
uncertainty.  In particular, given the number of bankruptcy judges presiding 
over cases in the United States and the myriad backgrounds of these judges, 
predicting the treatment of complicated financial contracts upon a future 
bankruptcy filing would be quite difficult.  This uncertainty might have 
detrimental (i.e., inefficient) effects on the larger derivatives markets, 
which has importance well beyond the world of bankruptcy.14 
The weakness of this latter argument lays in its general applicability:  
every counterparty to a contract likely fears how it will be treated in 
bankruptcy.15  Moreover, the argument is in fact less powerful with regard 
to derivative contracts, inasmuch as chapter 11 cases involving derivative 
transactions have a high probability of being filed in but a handful of 
jurisdictions,16 and the calculation of breach damages is likely more 
transparent than it would be in connection with other contracts.17  That is, 
derivatives are less likely than other contracts to be subject to the full range 
of possible outcomes that result from the diversity in the bankruptcy bench 
and counterparties to these contracts can thus better estimate the likely 
result upon default.  The policy reasons for offering derivatives special 
treatment remain vague.18 
This is not to say that the delay associated with chapter 11 is costless.  
Rather, the question is why derivative counterparties should not have to 
endure this cost like every other creditor. 
The cost imposed by chapter 11 is a cost imposed on all unsecured 
creditors, resulting from a plausible policy judgment that the collective 
gains from the reorganization process exceed the sum of these costs.  The 
special treatment of derivative contracts is just one more example of the 
 
at 103-04.  For purposes of this article, I place this argument to the side, although it clearly 
must figure in any broader analysis of the special treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy. 
 14. See generally Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts And The 
New Bankruptcy Code:  Insulating Markets From Bankrupt Debtors And Bankruptcy 
Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641 (2005) (making a similar argument). 
 15. Cf. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 7, at 98-99 (noting that the safe harbors cover 
too many and too few contracts). 
 16. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company 
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York:  Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”, 54 VAND. 
L. REV. 231, 232 (2001) (explaining that Delaware had become the lead jurisdiction of 
choice in which to file bankruptcy in the early 1990’s); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. 
Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1357, 1360 (2000) (observing that publically traded companies prefer to file 
chapter 11 in New York and Delaware); see also Stephen J. Lubben, Delaware’s 
Irrelevance, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 267, 270 (2008) (stating that Delaware was a lead 
choice for large chapter 11 cases). 
 17. I will concede that the damages are potentially more volatile in the derivatives 
context, subject to change on a daily or even hourly basis, but this does not seem to change 
whether the derivatives are inside or outside the bankruptcy process. 
 18. However, the public choice explanation for the special treatment appears obvious. 
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increasing tendency for special interest legislation to erode the efficiency of 
chapter 11 by piecemeal repeal of the chapter.19  At some point, this trend 
could completely undermine the collective process that is chapter 11. 
* * * 
After a brief review of the Bankruptcy Code’s assumption and 
rejection provisions, and the provisions that provide special treatment to 
derivatives, I address the key issues in order.  First, I show how the 
Bankruptcy Code’s provisions regarding the assumption and rejection of 
contracts are unremarkable in a world where parties always retain an option 
to breach.  To be sure, in bankruptcy breach damages will most often be 
under-compensated, as the debtor is insolvent.  But this fact is exogenous 
to either chapter 11 or the Bankruptcy Code – insolvency is a risk 
regardless of the presence or absence of any given bankruptcy system.20  
The Bankruptcy Code adds one unique element—its prohibition on 
termination solely because of the bankruptcy filing—but I show how this 
simply prevents inefficient breaches based on extraneous factors, such as 
spite or fear of the bankruptcy system.  Given this understanding of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the special treatment of derivatives appears increasingly 
suspect. 
I then address the argument that the special treatment can be 
rationalized as a recognition that derivative contracts are assets that do not 
contribute to the debtor’s going concern value.  After a brief overview of 
the most common forms of derivatives, I demonstrate how this argument 
fails in the case of derivatives used for hedging and illustrate the point with 
examples from several annual reports.  I also illuminate the simple point 
that the Bankruptcy Code is unique in treating all derivatives alike, while 
other areas of law, notably the Tax Code, expressly recognize the 
importance of the hedging versus speculation distinction when addressing 
the treatment of derivatives. 
In this final section of the paper I also concentrate on the implications 
of these conclusions:  in particular, does this analysis argue for the 
complete repeal of the Bankruptcy Code’s special derivative provisions?  I 
think not.21  Instead, I argue that these provisions should continue to apply 
 
 19. See generally Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal Of 
Chapter 11:  The Significant Business Provisions Of The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention And 
Consumer Protection Act Of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 603 (2005) (arguing that special 
interest lobbying has lead to Bankruptcy Code changes that adversely affect the ability of 
businesses to reorganize). 
 20. One could argue that breaches of real estate leases and employment contracts are 
under-compensated as a result of sections 502(b)(6) and (7) which cap these claims.  I view 
these provisions as providing protection against shirking of the duty to mitigate, although 
clearly there is an unanswered (and perhaps unanswerable) empirical question lurking 
behind my assumption. 
 21. This answer is, of course, somewhat dependent on the narrow focus of the paper.  
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in chapter 7 cases.  Moreover, they should presumptively apply in chapter 
11 cases involving financial firms, which are more likely to involve 
speculative derivatives, where argument about the lack of going concern 
value has the most salience.22  In chapter 11 cases involving non-financial 
debtors, the special derivative provisions should be presumptively 
inapplicable, subject to a showing that the derivatives in question are in fact 
speculative. 
I.  ASSUMPTION, REJECTION, AND DERIVATIVES 
Upon a chapter 11 filing, an “estate” is created comprised of virtually 
every asset in which the debtor holds a legal or equitable interest as of the 
petition date, as well as the proceeds, rents or profits from those assets.23  In 
addition, the continued stability of this estate is ensured by the automatic 
stay, which halts creditor efforts to gain control of estate assets.24 
The debtor’s contracts and leases begin bankruptcy with one foot in 
the estate and one foot out.25 
Specifically, because section 362(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,  which 
provides a list of exceptions to the automatic stay, does not mention 
termination of contracts with the debtor, several courts have held that non-
debtor parties are precluded from unilaterally terminating a contract or 
lease with the debtor, absent relief from the automatic stay.26  Why this 
should be so, especially in cases where the contract would be terminable 
outside of bankruptcy, is unclear.  Arguably the automatic stay should not 
 
See supra note 13. 
 22. Of course, many of these firms may be forced into chapter 7, depending on their 
corporate structure.  See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (excluding corporations that are not organized 
under section 25A of the Federal Reserve Act and operate, or operate as, a multilateral 
clearing organization pursuant to section 409 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 from being a debtor under chapter 11). 
 23. 11 U.S.C. § 541. 
 24. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
 25. In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 687, 700-01 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
 26. E.g., In re Computer Comnc’ns, 824 F.2d 725, 728-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
non-debtor violated the automatic stay statute by terminating its contract unilaterally); In re 
El Paso Refinery, L.P., 220 B.R. 37, 43-44 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998) (stating that pending 
assumption or rejection of the estate, the non-debtor party to an executor contract is bound 
by terms of the contract); Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. (In re 
Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc.), 119 B.R. 857, 860 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (finding that 
non-debtor may not terminate contract without first obtaining relief from the automatic 
stay); see also Douglas W. Bordewieck, The Postpetition, Pre-Rejection, Pre-Assumption 
Status of an Executory Contract, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 199-200 (1985) (observing that 
during the period from the date of filing until the date on which the debtor-in-possession 
assumes or rejects an executory contract, the non-debtor is bound to perform while the 
debtor-in-possession is temporarily not bound to perform). 
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give the debtor greater contractual rights than it enjoys outside of 
bankruptcy.27 
More precisely, section 365(e)(1) prohibits a party from terminating 
its contract with the debtor even if the contract contains an ipso facto 
(bankruptcy termination) clause that excuses the non-debtor from 
performing the agreement when the other party enters bankruptcy.28   It is 
therefore more accurate to say that bankruptcy does not affect the contract, 
regardless of the parties’ agreements to the contrary.  The precise rights and 
obligations of the parties are otherwise found in state contract law. 
The debtor’s agreements can be seen as partially outside of the estate, 
because the debtor must make the initial decision to either “reject” or 
“assume” each of its contracts and unexpired leases.29  If a debtor assumes 
a contract, the contract comes entirely into the estate and the debtor 
becomes bound by its terms.30  If a debtor “rejects” a contract the debtor 
commits a breach and the non-debtor party is left with a pre-petition claim 
for damages.31  The debtor’s election essentially decides whether the 
contract will be treated as an asset or a claim. 
In chapter 11, the debtor may generally assume or reject a contract at 
any time before the confirmation of a plan, or even under a plan.32  The 
court can order an earlier decision, or the counterparty can simply move to 
lift the automatic stay to allow it to proceed as it would outside of 
bankruptcy.33 
Section 362 of the Bankruptcy code provides for relief from the 
automatic stay for "cause," including the lack of adequate protection of an 
interest in the property, something only applicable to secured creditors, or 
in instances where the debtor has no equity in the property and the property 
 
 27. See Hurley v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 213 U.S. 126, 134-35 (1909) 
(finding that the contract between debtor and debtee remained the same as before the 
bankruptcy). 
 28. See In re Triangle Laboratories, Inc., 663 F.2d 463, 465 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding that 
a bankruptcy termination clause to a contract that was made after the Bankruptcy Code 
became governing law was not enforceable). 
 29. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).  See also In re Qintex Entm’t, Inc., 950 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (observing that executory contracts contain “obligations of both parties that are 
so far unperformed that the failure of either party to complete performance would constitute 
material breach and thus excuse the performance of the other”); Streeter v. Sumner, 31 N.H. 
542, 556-558 (1855) (stating that the assignee can choose which contracts to honor or 
repudiate if the contract will subject the estate to future losses). 
 30. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1); Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: 
Understanding "Rejection", 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 846-47 (1988). 
 31. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g). 
 32. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2). 
 33. See In re Nat’l Envtl Waste Corp., 191 B.R. 832, 834 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).  
Again, this assumes that the automatic stay is applicable, but most non-debtor parties are 
sufficiently risk adverse and thus will move to lift the stay in all cases. 
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is not necessary for an effective reorganization.34  "Cause" is not defined by 
the Bankruptcy Code, but, as I argue in the next part of this paper, it should 
include those instances where the counterparty seeks to exercise its non-
bankruptcy right of breach, subject to some assurance of the party’s prompt 
payment of expectation damages.35 
* * * 
Derivatives are essentially outside of this system.36  Termination of a 
derivative is exempt from the automatic stay.37  Ipso facto clauses are 
enforceable in the derivative context.38  And termination of derivative 
contracts is expressly exempt from latter attack as either a constructive 
fraudulent transfer or preference.39  Likewise, collateral provided as part of 
a derivative transaction may be foreclosed upon without concern that doing 
so violates the Bankruptcy Code.40 
The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code enhanced this special 
treatment by adding section 561 that specifically preserves the contractual 
right to terminate, liquidate, accelerate or offset under a “master netting 
agreement” and across a broad range of derivative contracts.41  In addition, 
now a master agreement and several other derivative-related agreements 
can also be deemed “swap agreements” within the meaning of the 
Bankruptcy Code.42 
Indeed, it seems that every derivative instrument qualifies as a “swap 
agreement” under the new amendments.43  Given that virtually every 
conceivable derivative transaction is now exempt from the automatic stay 
and the debtor’s power to assume and reject, this seems like overkill.  
However, the industry plainly wanted to make it very clear that the 
bankruptcy court could not interfere with the normal, non-bankruptcy 
operations of the derivatives markets. 
These specific provisions addressing master agreements are very 
 
 34. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). 
 35. See, e.g., Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 643 (N.H. 1929) (citing Davis v. New 
England Cotton Yarn Co., 92 A. 732, 733 (N.H. 1914)) ("By ‘damages,’ as that term is used 
in the law of contract, is intended compensation for a breach."). 
 36. Rhett Campbell, Financial Markets Contracts and BAPCPA, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
697, 712 (2005). 
 37. 11 U.S.C. § 560, 561(a). 
 38. 11 U.S.C. § 560. 
 39. 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(g), 548(d)(2)(D), 561(a).  Arguably the 2005 amendments also 
limit the ability to bring an action for actual fraudulent transfers as well.  Compare 11 
U.S.C. §548(c), with 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(D). 
 40. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17). 
 41. 11 U.S.C. § 561. 
 42. 11 U.S.C. § 101(38A). 
 43. See Morrison & Riegel, supra note 14, at 651-52 (explaining how the new 
amendments not only expand the list of protected swaps, but expand it to include nearly 
every contract traded in a derivative market). 
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important because most of the derivatives in the global derivatives market 
are documented under International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) documentation.44  The ISDA Master Agreement, the most current 
version of which is the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement, is a standard 
agreement used in the industry to provide a set of default terms for a series 
of derivative transactions between a set of counterparties.  A “schedule” is 
attached to the Master Agreement to account for party-specific terms of the 
deal.  The economic terms of individual derivative transactions are 
reflected in “confirmation” term sheets, which are deemed to be part of the 
single Master Agreement between the parties, somewhat like the schedules 
of equipment used in long-term equipment leases.  Each confirmation will 
incorporate by reference a relevant set of ISDA definitions.  The effect of 
the new amendment to the Bankruptcy Code is to bless this approach to 
derivatives and protect them from the claim, common in the equipment 
leasing context, that each schedule constitutes a separate contract that can 
be assumed or rejected by debtor. 
II. REJECTION AND THE OPTION TO BREACH 
 It has long been settled that the default remedy for breach of 
contract is an award of expectation damages.45  The purpose of this remedy 
is to put the non-breaching party in “as good a position as he would have 
been had the” contract been performed.46  Punitive damages are rarely 
awarded, usually limited to situations in which the breach of a contract 
would also constitute an independent tort.47  The equitable remedy of 
specific performance, which is awarded more often than punitive damages, 
is also quite limited.48  In fact, specific performance will not be awarded 
unless the award of expectation damages would be inadequate to make the 
non-breaching party whole.49 
 
 44. Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution In The Capital Markets: Credit Default 
Swaps, Insurance And A Theory Of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 178-
79 (2007). 
 45. Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic 
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 281 (1970). 
 46. Id. 
 47. William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 
636 (1999); see also Clark A. Remington, Intentional Interference with Contract and the 
Doctrine of Efficient Breach:  Fine Tuning the Notion of the Contract Breacher as 
Wrongdoer, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 645 (1999) (arguing that courts should only punish 
interference that leads to a wrongful breach). 
 48. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, The Theory of 
Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 975, 1016 
(2005). 
 49. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.6 (3d ed. 2004); see 
also John P. Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1959) (characterizing 
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For a long time, contractual remedies were justified on moral 
grounds.50  A contract involves a promise by one party to perform some act 
in exchange for a promise by the other party to do another act and the 
failure to fulfill one’s promise was seen as morally blameworthy.51  
Therefore, “a properly organized society should not tolerate” a failure to 
perform as promised.52 
 But in the business context, the morality of most contracting parties 
is at most derivative of the morality of the actor’s agents, given that the 
actors are typically artificial “persons” created by state corporate statutes.53  
Moreover, if the failure to keep a promise is morally blameworthy, why are 
punitive damages not recoverable?54  Why are the damages limited to those 
that put the non-breaching party in the position he would have been in had 
the contract been performed? 
For similar reasons, Holmes explained that “the duty to keep a 
contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if 
you do not keep it, - and nothing else.”55  That is, a contract is better 
viewed as a choice between fulfilling a promise or breaching and paying 
damages.56  To be sure, in certain extreme instances the law of restitution 
creates a conflict with this conception of contracts, but in the vast run of 
cases Holmes’ conception remains accurate.57 
 
the major types of restitution remedies and their interaction with damage remedies in cases 
of substantial breach). 
 50. Birmingham, supra note 45, at 281; see also Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract 
Immoral?, 56 EMORY L. J. 439 (2006) (questioning whether breaching a contract is immoral 
if there is no contingency provision in the contract). 
 51. Shavell, supra note 50 at 439. 
 52. Birmingham, supra note 45, at 281 (quoting Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of 
Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 571-72 (1933)). 
 53. Cf. Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract 
Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 685-86 (1986) (discussing how an economic analysis of 
contract law rejects the view of a contract as a promise but rather as a means of promoting 
efficiency). 
 54. See Birmingham, supra note 45, at 284 (explaining that penalizing efficient breach 
by overcompensating the innocent party would discourage efficient reallocation of 
community resources). 
 55. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 
(1897).  But see Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach 
and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2000) (linking the concept of 
efficient breach to the misunderstanding of Holmes’ theory). 
 56. I make no claims in this paper about whether this reality is socially efficient.  See 
generally Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success 
or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 834-38 (2002-2003)(explaining that a justification for 
expectation damages, that performance of the contract occurs if and only if it is efficient, is 
premature). 
 57. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (Tentative 
Draft No. 4, 2005) (providing for restitution for breaches that are “both material and 
opportunistic”); see also J. Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of 
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Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code can then be seen as an extension 
of the classic concept of expectation damages and the more recent 
understandings of the option to breach.  Upon entering bankruptcy a 
debtor-firm examines its contracts and decides which ones have a negative 
net present value.  The debtor breaches these contracts, by rejecting them 
under section 365, and assumes the contracts that are valuable. 
Seen in this light, section 365 loses much of rhetorical power—it no 
longer performs any “magic,” it simply allows the debtor to do what it can 
always do outside of bankruptcy.  An insolvent corporate debtor’s 
incentives with regard to the breach decision are skewed by the reality that 
the decision to breach does not impose additional costs on the firm.  
Instead, because an insolvent debtor’s unencumbered assets are finite, the 
decision to breach a contract reallocates wealth among the unsecured 
creditors.  But this is not the product of any bankruptcy system, but instead 
it is the result of the combined effects of insolvency and limited liability.58 
Indeed, outside of bankruptcy an insolvent firm has an incentive to 
breach every contract that is unprofitable, not simply those contracts whose 
breach can be termed “efficient.”59  For example, assume Bogartco, Inc. 
signs a contract to produce fedoras for a department store at $10 per unit, 
and material costs rise so that it now costs $12 per unit to manufacture the 
hats.60  If Bogartco is solvent, it will not breach under these facts because 
doing so is not profitable:  assuming that material costs are not specific to 
Bogartco, the department store will pay $12 per unit to cover Bogartco’s 
breach, and Bogartco will pay $2 per unit in expectation damages.61  But if 
 
the Law of Restitution, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 66-67 (2007) (explaining that in many 
instances, restitution provides a means of recovery for acts described as wrongful in other 
areas of the law).  By its own terms, the new restatement instructs that contract damages 
“are ordinarily an adequate remedy if they can be used to acquire a full equivalent to the 
promised performance in a substitute transaction.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), RESTITUTION 
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).  That is, restitution is not 
available when the non-breaching party can “cover,” even if the breaching party profits from 
the breach.  Id.  This is illustrated further in my “Bogartco” example.  See infra p.112. 
 58. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) (arguing against shareholder 
limited liability where plaintiff is a tort victim). 
 59. See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 254-55; cf. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and 
Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle 
in Contract Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 975, 997 (2000) (explaining that breaching a contract is 
efficient and thus desirable when one party’s gain from breaching, after payment of 
expectation damages, outweighs the non-breaching party’s loss from the breach). 
 60. See David W. Barnes, The Anatomy of Contract Damages and Efficient Breach 
Theory, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 397, 408-412 (1998) (explaining that despite its simplicity 
in certain contexts, there are frequently more complex cases where it is difficult to ascertain 
whether a breach is efficient). 
 61. I am obviously assuming that Bogartco is unable to exploit the transaction costs of 
enforcement and other damage rules that limit the department store’s recovery in the real 
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Bogartco is insolvent it will breach the contract, since the expectation 
damages will simply expand the size of the total claims asserted against its 
unencumbered assets and the firm is presumably indifferent as to the 
distribution of its assets among its creditors. 
The Bankruptcy Code does not change this calculation, as the power 
to reject under section 365 is precisely the same as the power to breach 
while insolvent.62  The “cherry picking” argument then loses much of its 
force –- rejection is the equivalent of breach, and assumption quo 
assumption is simply a decision to perform under the contract.63 
This story does not change when viewed from the non-debtor side of 
the contract.  Upon a counterparty’s bankruptcy, the non-debtor party can 
choose to continue to perform or to breach.  If the latter course is chosen, 
the non-debtor will most likely seek court approval, which will involve 
showing that there is “cause” to lift the automatic stay and allow breach of 
 
world.  These issues are especially likely to influence the parties when the damages are 
small relative to the potential transaction costs, such as in my example.  For more on these 
issues, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just 
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on An Enforcement Model and A Theory of Efficient 
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977) (hypothesizing that a liquidated damages provision 
is in many circumstances the most efficient means by which contracting parties can insure 
against consequences of a breach that are not easily quantifiable); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient 
Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982) (examining the fallacy in 
the so-called “simple-efficient-breach analysis”); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific 
Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979) (arguing that specific performance as a remedy 
should be as routinely available as damages); see also Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. 
Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist Society, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984, 984 (1995) 
(acknowledging a paradox that arises when rival visions of the good life conflict due to the 
absence of a comprehensive doctrine of the good life that would encompass each party’s 
conception). 
 62. On this point I depart slightly from Professor Westbrook’s otherwise brilliant 
explication of section 365, inasmuch as he ties section 365 to the ability to pay breach 
claims at an amount less than the face value of the claim.  Westbrook, supra note 9, at 253-
55.  My conception of contracts, at least in a corporate bankruptcy setting, may also be 
closer to “Holmes and Posner” than to Professor Westbrook’s.  Westbrook, supra note 9, at 
280 (“Whether Posner and Holmes like it or not, promise-breaking has a moral dimension . . 
. .  In part, the grant in section 365 of the right of assumption and rejection may reflect the 
need to give the trustee the moral right to breach a contract.  The trustee's moral position is 
sound, because it is acting for the innocent unsecured creditors, not for the deadbeat 
debtor.”). 
 63. Section 365 does differ from state contract law on one point, but it is not clear that 
this difference provides any support to the cherry picking argument.  Specifically, under 
state law a contract term may prevent or restrict a party from assigning its rights under that 
contract, but Bankruptcy Code section 365(f)(1) states that a debtor may assume and assign 
an executory contract or unexpired lease “notwithstanding a provision in [the] executory 
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or 
conditions the assignment of such contract or lease.”  11 U.S.C. § 365.  This provision 
results in a wealth transfer from the non-debtor party to the unsecured creditors generally, 
but it does result in any special benefit to the debtor. 
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the contract.64  But upon the non-debtor’s demonstration of its willingness 
and ability to pay expectation damages, there does not seem to be any good 
reason for a court to deny the motion.  Although courts sometimes assert 
the ability to order the non-debtor party to perform a contract,65 I take this 
to mean that the non-debtor party must either perform or pay full breach 
damages to the debtor.66  The bankruptcy courts' general history in equity—
which tends to be oversold in any event67—should not be read to include an 
ability to afford specific performance in instances where it would not be 
available outside of bankruptcy.68 
Often a debtor will incur substantial costs to cover the breached 
contract, given the risk premium most counterparties will extract as a result 
of the debtor’s financial condition.69  In many instances the high costs of 
cover—which will translate into large breach damages—will render the 
breach costs prohibitive, but this does not alter the fundamental option to 
breach. 
This also explains the Bankruptcy Code’s general prohibition on ipso 
facto clauses.70  Initially, it must be acknowledged that section 365(e) is an 
under-theorized area of the Bankruptcy Code.71  The leading treatise 
unhelpfully explains that “[s]ection 365(e) expressly invalidates ipso facto 
and other bankruptcy termination clauses that might otherwise prevent the 
estate from receiving the benefit of an executory contract or lease.”72  To 
the extent this is an attempt to justify the provision based on the gains to 
the debtor, the analysis is rather vacuous.  It is easy to imagine a good 
number of provisions that could be created if the sole aim is to transfer 
 
 64. See In re El Paso Refinery, L.P., 220 B.R. 37, 43-44 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (stating that 
the “relief from stay” option is not a true alternative to the choice framed by section 365 
because at the hearing on such a motion, the non-debtor party must establish “cause” for 
relief from stay). 
 65. In re Continental Energy Assoc. Ltd., 178 B.R. 405 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1995); see 
also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1231 (“[A]n insolvent firm that has entered bankruptcy may 
‘assume’ an ongoing contract and thereby require the solvent firm to perform it.”). 
 66. See U.C.C. § 2-713 (defining buyer’s damages for non-delivery or repudiation). 
 67. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 382 (6th ed. 1848) (“This 
[bankruptcy] jurisdiction of the English chancellor is not in the court of chancery, but in the 
individual who holds the great seal.”). 
 68. See Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial 
Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2006) (explaining a bankruptcy 
court’s role as a court of equity). 
 69. See U.C.C. § 2-712 (explaining a buyer’s right to cover). 
 70. Clauses that allow automatic termination of contracts upon one party’s bankruptcy. 
 71. Professor Schwartz argues that ipso facto clauses are “a perfect substitute for 
accurate expectation damages,” that guard against judicial errors in calculating such 
damages. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1234.  It seems odd that the parties would embed such 
protection in a clause that is only triggered upon bankruptcy or insolvency. 
 72. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 365.07 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommers eds., 
15th ed. rev. 2006). 
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value to the debtor to facilitate its reorganization.  A provision forfeiting 
employee pensions to the debtor would pass this test, but who would 
support such a move? 
 More convincingly, section 365(e) can be seen as a prohibition on 
inefficient breach.  Termination based on the non-debtor’s general fear of 
bankruptcy, refusal to deal with “deadbeats,” or other idiosyncratic reasons 
are disallowed, unless the party in question is willing to pay breach 
damages to the debtor.73  The non-debtor’s willingness to pay breach 
damages limits terminations to those that are socially efficient.74  Or, stated 
otherwise, limiting breaches to those situations where the non-debtor party 
is willing to pay damages is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s attempt 
to treat contracts as though the bankruptcy never happened.75 
* * * 
Thus re-conceptualized, the special treatment of derivatives becomes 
theoretically suspect, especially when based on arguments about “cherry 
picking” of contracts.  But the delay that the Bankruptcy Code imposes on 
the parties’ breach option could be significant in the case of a financial firm 
in bankruptcy.  For this reason I do not argue for the complete repeal of the 
Bankruptcy Code’s special derivative provisions.  But before addressing 
this point, I first address the argument that the special treatment of 
derivatives can be justified by their lack of going concern value. 
III. THE GOING CONCERN VALUE OF DERIVATIVES & THE LIMITS OF 
SPECIAL TREATMENT 
Derivatives are contracts that derive their value from interest rates, the 
outcome of specific events, or the price of underlying assets such as debt or 
equities.76  Options, futures, and forwards are all long-recognized types of 
derivatives.77 
 
 73. Section 365(e) also prohibits using ipso facto clauses as a kind of cross default 
provision, that would allow cancellation of all contracts, whether or not doing so would be 
socially efficient.  In short, 365(e) prohibits the kind of cross netting that the Bankruptcy 
Code’s new derivative provisions expressly allow.  11 U.S.C. §§546(g), 548(d)(2)(D), 
561(a). 
 74. Cf. Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063, 
1127-28 (2002) (describing situations under the Non-Interference and Non-Expropriation 
principles where either the bankruptcy trustee or the non-debtor must continue to perform 
under the contract). 
 75. See Hurley v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 213 U.S. 126, 134-135 (1909) 
(holding that the equitable rights of the parties were not changed by the commencement of 
bankruptcy proceedings and thus all obligations of a legal and equitable nature remained 
unchanged). 
 76. ALLEN, BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 4, at 727. 
 77. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE 133 
(1928) (stating that it is well founded that “the privilege granted to the holder of a 
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The heart of the modern derivatives markets was born in the early 
1980s with the advent of swap agreements.78  One of the most common 
swaps is an interest rate swap, where the parties (or “counterparties”) agree 
to exchange a fixed rate cash flow for a floating rate cash flow.79  The 
amount of the cash flows is determined by reference to a hypothetical or 
“notional” amount of money that is never actually exchanged between the 
parties.80  Similar swaps can be written on currency fluctuations or 
commodity prices.  These swaps and other derivatives can be used for 
either speculation or to hedge against future changes in the prices of 
underlying rate or commodity.81 
 Financial firms and pension funds are the most obvious speculative 
users of derivatives, but corporations also use derivatives and the vast 
majority of those users do so for hedging purposes.82   Derivatives here are 
used for the simple purpose of avoiding the adverse effects of future spikes 
in the price of a needed commodity or sudden change in the value of the 
payments the corporation receives from sales abroad. 
 Thus, Owens Corning, a manufacturer of building materials, reports 
in its 2006 10-K that it uses derivatives to hedge “certain energy and 
energy related exposures on a rolling forward basis up to 36 months out.”83  
And the Union Pacific Corporation, operator of one of the country’s largest 
railroads, likewise reports that it uses derivatives “to assist in managing . . . 
overall exposure to fluctuations in interest rates and fuel prices . . . [Union 
Pacific does] not use derivative financial instruments for speculative 
purposes.”84 
General Motors Corporation’s 2006 annual report notes extensive use 
of derivatives for hedging, explaining that “[r]ecently, the global 
 
convertible obligation to require stock at his election instead of money in payment of the 
debt evidenced by the instrument is an option”); Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of 
Global Derivatives Regulation 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 421, 424-28 (2001) (explaining 
the difference between options and forwards as classes of derivatives). 
 78. See Bank One Corp. v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. 174, 186-87 (2003) (“The origin of the 
swaps market is generally traced to a currency swap negotiated between the World Bank 
and IBM in 1981. That transaction involved an exchange of payments in Swiss francs for 
payments in deutschmarks.  The first interest rate swap was negotiated with the Student 
Loan Marketing Association in 1982.”). 
 79. ALLEN, BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 4, at 735-37; Louis Vitale, Comment, 
Interest Rate Swaps under the Commodity Exchange Act, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 539, 
547-59 (2001). 
 80. Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust, 322 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 81. See Robert J. Aalberts & Percy S. Poon, Derivatives and the Modern Prudent 
Investor Rule:  Too Risky or Too Necessary?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 525, 552-53 (2006) 
(explaining how derivatives can be used either to speculate or to hedge). 
 82. Henk Berkman & Michael E. Bradbury, Empirical Evidence on the Corporate Use 
of Derivatives, 25 FIN. MANG. 5 (1996). 
 83. Owens Corning, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 53 (Mar. 14, 2007). 
 84. Union Pacific, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 34 (Feb. 23, 2007). 
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automotive industry has experienced increases in commodity costs, most 
notably for raw materials such as aluminum, copper, and precious metals . . 
. .  [GM] attempt[s] to manage…fluctuations in commodity prices by using 
derivatives to economically hedge a portion of raw material purchases.”85  
And later noting that “GM has foreign currency exposures related to 
buying, selling, and financing in currencies other than the local currencies 
in which it operates.  Derivative instruments, such as foreign currency 
forwards, swaps, and options are used to hedge these exposures.”86 
If any of these firms enter chapter 11—Owens Corning recently left 
chapter 11, while GM recently filed, so the argument is not purely 
hypothetical—these derivative contracts could be an integral part of the 
firm’s going concern value.  For example, given the recent weakness in the 
U.S. dollar, currency swaps may save a firm from incurring significant 
losses on contracts with foreign suppliers. 
With this understanding of the role of derivatives in modern business, 
it is hard to accept the blanket argument that derivatives are not firm 
specific assets, and thus do not contribute to a firm’s going concern value.87  
Rather, in the chapter 11 case of any large non-financial firm, the 
Bankruptcy Code’s provisions allowing for the termination of swaps and 
other derivatives upon bankruptcy are inconsistent with the central goal of 
maximizing the value of the debtor’s estate.88  Indeed, they represent little 
more than a wealth transfer to the financial institutions that stand on the 
other side of these swaps. 
Moreover, it is not clear why the Bankruptcy Code should adopt this 
sort of “one size fits all” approach to derivatives.  In the Tax Code, it has 
long been recognized that a corporation’s investments in financial 
instruments can exist for the purpose of speculation or hedging.89  In the 
first case, the instrument is treated as a capital asset; in the second case the 
hedge is treated as part of the firm’s normal business operations.90  The 
difference between ordinary loss and capital loss tax treatment is 
significant.  Under the Tax Code, corporate capital losses can only be 
deducted against capital gains in the corporation's computation of its 
income for federal income tax, while the corporation can offset ordinary 
 
 85. General Motors, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Mar. 13, 2007). 
 86. Id. at 94. 
 87. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 7. 
 88. See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1050 (2007) (noting that these “blanket rules” invite strategic 
termination by non-debtors). 
 89. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955); see Paul M. Schmidt, The 
Hedging Rules: Clarity or Confusion?, 72 TAX NOTES 1169 (1996) (discussing the IRS’s 
recognition of financial instruments’ roles as hedging transactions). 
 90. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1221(a)(7), 1221(b)(2); Treas. Reg § 1.1221-2(b) (disallowing 
hedging transactions from the IRS’s “capital asset” definition). 
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losses against all income.91  Corporations, as a general rule, have a larger 
amount of ordinary income than capital gains.  The Bankruptcy Code could 
presumably draw similar distinctions, as I suggest below. 
To be sure, this does not mean that the Bankruptcy Code’s derivatives 
provisions are always unwarranted, but rather that they are just overbroad.  
It also bears noting that there may be non-domestic reasons for urging a 
broad, arguably excessively broad, exemption of derivatives from the core 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  In particular, other jurisdictions may 
operate corporate reorganization systems that are inefficient or opaque in 
comparison to chapter 11.  Broad exemption provisions may be warranted 
in these jurisdictions, and the derivatives industry may find it useful to note 
that important European and North American jurisdictions also follow such 
a course.92  But it hardly seems appropriate or sensible to endure tinkering 
with the Bankruptcy Code just to support an international sales pitch.93 
Once we acknowledge that derivatives are used for two distinct 
purposes, the Bankruptcy Code’s focus on financial debtors becomes quite 
puzzling, given that financial firms clearly do not make up the bulk of 
chapter 11 cases.  As Professors Partnoy and Skeel have argued, “the 
blanket exception for derivatives should be rethought.”94 
The foregoing has made the case that the Bankruptcy Code’s special 
derivatives provisions are overbroad as applied to non-financial firms in 
chapter 11.  That leaves two categories of firms for which the special 
provisions might still have merit:  firms that liquidate under chapter 7 and 
financial firms that file under either chapter 7 or 11. 
Firms that file under chapter 7 declare their intention to liquidate and 
 
 91. See Circle K Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 665 (1991); see also Fed. Nat'l 
Mortgage Ass'n v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 541, 569 (1993) (noting that hedges exist primarily to 
guard against risks in future price fluctuations). 
 92. See, e.g., Letter from Dr. Peter M Werner, Director of Policy, International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association, to Arman Galiaskarovich Dunayev, Chairman Agency of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan for the Regulation and Supervision of the Financial Market and 
Financial Organisations, (Apr. 15, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing the need for new 
legislation to clarify “the legal enforceability of the ISDA Master Agreement and in 
particular, close-out netting in Kazakhstan and thereby foster greater harmonization of 
international standards.”). 
 93. Adoption of these provisions by the United States also compels adoption of 
comparable provisions in jurisdictions that engage in regulatory competition with the United 
States.  Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Peter Kolla, Derivatives and the CCAA, in CANADIAN 
BANKRUPTCY & INSOLVENCY LAW 47, 55-56 (Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Anthony Dugan eds., 
2007). 
 94. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 88, at 1050 (“Although a more fine-grained approach 
that applied the automatic stay to some derivatives, such as those designed for insurance 
purposes, would complicate the treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy, we believe that a 
more nuanced approach is preferable to adopting a blanket rule that invites strategic 
termination by non-debtors.”). 
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likely destroy any chance at even a sale as a going concern.95  Seen in that 
light, it is hard to argue that such firms have any going concern value in 
their derivatives.  Moreover, given the party-specific nature of many of 
these transactions, particularly when used as hedges, there may be reasons 
to preclude their assignment to non-debtor parties – just as loans and 
insurance contracts are similarly not assignable.96  If non-assignable, there 
is no reason for the liquidating firm to keep derivative contracts in the 
estate, and the special treatment of derivatives is not objectionable. 
The treatment of financial firms is somewhat more problematic.  The 
derivatives industry has generally justified the special treatment of 
derivatives as justified by the need “to protect markets . . . particularly vital 
and sensitive to the delay and dislocation that can attach to bankruptcy 
proceedings.”97  Although arguably the lack of an automatic stay to give the 
markets time to gather information could lead to panic and financial 
contagion,98 the industry argument, if accepted, has the most weight in the 
case of financial firms, with large derivative portfolios.  The generally 
speculative nature of the portfolios also argues against any going concern 
value, and in favor of exclusion from the estate.99 
Accordingly, the special treatment of derivatives is most justified in 
chapter 7 cases and all types of cases involving financial firms.  In chapter 
11 cases of non-financial firms, on the other hand, there is no reason why 
derivatives should not be treated like any other contractual asset of the 
estate. 
These are simply rules of thumb, and thus I argue for a set of 
rebuttable presumptions corresponding with these two classes of 
bankruptcy cases.  The special rules for derivatives should be presumed to 
apply only in chapter 7 and financial firm bankruptcy cases.  And 
conversely, the special rules should be presumed inapplicable in the chapter 
11 cases of traditional, non-financial, debtors.  Any party in interest could 
move to rebut the presumptions. 
While it is certainly arguable that this approach does not go far 
enough,100 it retains the special derivative treatment for those cases where 
such treatment is arguably most appropriate, while limiting the extreme 
overreaching of the 2005 amendments as currently enacted. 
 
 95. Stephen J. Lubben, Business Liquidation, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 69 (2007). 
 96. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c). 
 97. Brief for International Swaps And Derivatives Association, Inc. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, 7, Hutson v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours (In re Nat’l Gas Distrib.), 
556 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2105), 2008 U.S. 4th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 63, **7 
(original on file with author). 
 98. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 7, at 103-04; Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 88, at 
1050. 
 99. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 7, at 114-16. 
 100. Supra note 13. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article makes three main claims.  First, the ability to assume and 
reject contracts under the Bankruptcy Code is not particularly special, and 
simply reflects the general option to breach and pay damages that exists 
under non-bankruptcy contract law.  Second, the use of derivatives for 
hedging is distinct from the use for speculation, and when used for 
hedging, derivatives are like other contractual assets.  And third, the special 
treatment of derivatives under the Bankruptcy Code is overbroad because it 
fails to acknowledge this distinction.  Reframing the special derivative 
provisions as rules that could apply to a case under a set of presumptions 
would return these provisions to a more logical, justifiable scope and thus 
represents a first step in rationalizing what otherwise seems to be a clear 
case of overreaching by special interests. 
 
 
 
